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Abstract: Germany’s energy transition has been accompanied by a near doubling of power 
prices for private households since the outset of the new millennium. Millions of poor 
households and those that are close to the poverty threshold are likely to suffer from these 
increases in electricity cost. Focusing on low-income households, this paper illustrates the 
distributional implications of Germany’s energy transition by investigating their electricity 
cost burden between 2006 and 2012, using panel data from the German Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey (GRECS). Our estimates suggest that in 2012, on average, households at 
poverty risk allocated 5.5% of their income to power and, hence, paid nearly as much for 
covering their electricity consumption as for heating purposes. Given Germany’s ambitious 
targets to expand the share of costly renewable technologies in electricity consumption to 
50% in 2030, which has broad support among the electorate, it is to be expected that 
households’ expenditure for power will increase in the upcoming years. As it is likely that 
Germany continues its widely recognized energy policy, this raises the urgent question of how 
to mitigate the regressive impact of further increasing electricity prices on poor households. 
Direct cash transfers are suggested here as a non-distortionary instrument for easing the 
burden of high prices, one that is directly targeted at those endangered by energy poverty. 
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1 Introduction 
Germany’s transition of its energy system – in German called Energiewende – is primarily 
characterized by the promotion of renewable energy technologies and the nuclear phase-out 
stipulated by the end of 2022 in response to the catastrophe in Japan’s Fukushima. While 
there is a broad support among the population for both aims, the policy-induced reduction of 
nuclear risks and negative environmental effects of fossil-based electricity generation, this 
transition will inevitably lead to further increasing electricity prices (Tews, 2013:3). Although 
this is the price that has to be paid to reduce these risks, as well as the dependence on oil and 
gas imports, this bodes poorly for many low-income households, as power prices for German 
households have virtually doubled since the introduction of the feed-in-tariff promotion 
scheme for renewable energy sources (RES) in 2000.  
Under this promotion regime, which is legally codified under the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), utilities are obliged to pay technology-
specific feed-in tariffs far above own production cost to those who produce green electricity 
using alternative technologies, such as solar and wind power plants. Ultimately, though, it is 
the industrial and private consumers who have to bear the cost induced by the promotion of 
renewable energy technologies through a surcharge on the price of electricity, called the EEG 
levy (Frondel et al., 2010). Through this support, the share of green electricity in (gross) 
consumption more than quadrupled between 2000 and 2013 and increased from 6.2% to more 
than 25% (Figure 1).   
The financial support stipulated by the EEG is indispensable for increasing the share 
of “green electricity”; without it, the high cost of most renewable energy technologies would 
make it impossible for them to compete with conventional electricity production. Between 
2009 and 2014, this surcharge almost quintupled, rising from 1.31 Euro Cent per kilowatt-
hour (kWh) to 6.24 ct/kWh (Figure 2). A major reason for this strong increase was the 
massive installation of photovoltaic (PV) capacities in recent years: At the end of 2014, total 
PV capacities exceeded 38 Gigawatt (GW), an amount that was more than six times higher 
than the 6 GW installed in 2008 (BMWi, 2014a, Table 1). With 6.17 ct/kWh in 2015, the 
EEG levy will temporarily stagnate, but a further increase in this levy and, hence, electricity 
prices is most likely if Germany keeps a similar pace in expanding its share of renewables in 
electricity production as over the past 15 years. 
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Figure 1: Share of Green Electricity in Germany’s Gross Electricity Consumption 
 
Source: BMWI (2014a) 
Focusing on low-income households, as these are prone to the risk of fuel poverty (e.g. 
Heindl, 2014:3, Moore, 2012:19), this paper illustrates the distributional implications of 
Germany’s energy transition by analyzing the evolution of the households’ electricity cost 
burden between 2006 and 2012, using panel data from the German Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey (GRECS).1 Our estimates suggest that low-income households are 
particularly adversely affected by recent power price increases: On average, our sample 
households spent 2.6% of their income for electricity in 2012, while households below the 
poverty risk line, defined by Germany’s fourth Poverty Report at 60% of the median income, 
allocated 5.5% of their income to power. For some types of low-income households, this 
burden is even much higher and has steadily increased over time. Meanwhile, it is comparable 
to the proportion that households spend to satisfy their demand for space and water heating. 
For a significant number of sample households at poverty risk, total energy cost adds up to 
more than 10%, a threshold at which the British Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC 2013) used to define households suffering from fuel poverty. 
Given Germany’s ambitious targets to expand the share of costly renewable 
technologies in electricity consumption, which various surveys indicate to have broad public 
appeal (e.g. Andor, Frondel and Vance, 2014), it is to be expected that households’ power 
                                                            
1 For more information on the panel and the German Residential Energy Consumption Survey (GRECS), see the 
project homepage: http://en.rwi-essen.de/haushaltsenergieverbrauch  
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expenditure will further increase in the upcoming years, not least due to the phase-out of the 
remaining power plants until 2022. This raises the urgent question of how to mitigate the 
regressive impact of increasing electricity prices on poor households and those that are 
endangered by poverty. After all, low-income households suffer more from a growing 
electricity cost burden than wealthy households, clearly indicating the regressive nature of 
rising energy prices (Nelson et al., 2011, 2012). Since it is likely that Germany continues its 
widely recognized energy policy, as the best strategy to offset the resulting regressive impact 
on the poor, we suggest unconditional cash transfers to households whose income qualifies 
them for assistance with their energy expenses. 
Figure 2: EEG Surcharge on Electricity Prices for the Promotion of Renewable Technologies in Cent per Kilowatt-
hour (kWh) 
 
Source: BDEW (2014) 
The following section presents figures on the dramatic growth of renewable capacities 
since the enactment of the current promotion scheme in 2000, as well as the resulting increase 
in electricity prices. Section 3 illustrates the distributional implications of Germany’s energy 
transition by analyzing the evolution of the households’ electricity cost burden between 2006 
and 2012, while Section 4 sketches possible future scenarios for electricity prices. The last 
section summarizes and concludes.  
2 Renewable Electricity Production in Germany 
In Germany, renewable energy technologies are promoted via a feed-in-tariff (FIT) system 
that has established itself as a role model and has been adopted by a wide range of countries 
in the world, even countries with a high endowment of sun such as Australia (Nelson et al. 
2011). Among the countries of the European Union, FITs have become the most popular 
promotion scheme (CEER 2013). Since the implementation of Germany’s FIT system in 
2000, installed capacities of renewable energy sources (RES) have increased remarkably. In 
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2013, these capacities were almost seven times higher than in 2000 (penultimate column of 
Table 1). Photovoltaic (PV) systems and onshore windmills have experienced the largest 
expansion, with PV capacities sky-rocketing: In 2010 alone, more than 7,000 Megawatt 
(MW) were installed, an amount that easily exceeded the cumulated capacities installed by 
2008.  
Table 1: Conventional and RES Capacities in Germany 
Year Hydropower (MW) 
Onshore-
Wind 
(MW) 
Offshore-
Wind 
(MW) 
Photovoltaic 
(MW) 
Biomass 
(MW) 
RES 
Capacities 
(MW) 
Conventional 
Capacities 
(MW) 
2000 4,831 6,097 0 114 1,288 12,330 107,500 
2001 4,831 8,738 0 176 1,412 15,157 106,800 
2002 4,937 11,976 0 296 1,615 18,824 100,900 
2003 4,953 14,593 0 435 2,329 22,311 99,400 
2004 5,186 16,612 0 1,105 2,630 25,533 100,900 
2005 5,210 18,375 0 2,056 3,526 29,167 98,800 
2006 5,193 20,568 0 2,899 4,283 32,943 98,400 
2007 5,137 22,183 0 4,170 4,723 36,216 99,800 
2008 5,164 23,815 0 6,120 5,256 40,358 101,700 
2009 5,340 25,632 60 10,566 5,995 47,601 101,300 
2010 5,407 27,012 168 17,554 6,599 56,748 104,000 
2011 5,625 28,857 203 25,039 7,148 66,880 98,000 
2012 5,607 30,996 308 32,643 7,537 77,103 97,300 
2013 5,613 33,757 903 35,948 8,086 84,338 94,000 
 
Source: BMWi (2014a). With an installed capacity of 24 MW in 2013, geothermic systems are of negligible relevance and 
thus not included in the table. 
Total capacities of RES amounted to about 84 Gigawatts (GW) in 2013, just 10 GW 
below those of conventional power plants (Table 1). Nevertheless, the share of green 
electricity in gross electricity consumption was only about 25% (Figure 1). This relatively 
modest share owes to the fact that wind and solar power are not available 24 hours a day.2 
Consequently, to reach Germany’s renewable goal of a 50% share in gross electricity 
consumption set for 2030, a multiple of today’s capacities have to be installed, an endeavor 
that will inevitably lead to higher cost of electricity generation. Moreover, a large portion of 
today’s conventional power plants has to be sustained to compensate for the intermittency of 
wind and sun, since storing volatile green electricity is likely to remain unprofitable for 
                                                            
2 For instance, while a year consists of 8,760 hours, a PV system installed in Germany exhibits just about 900 
full load hours on average (BDEW 2014). The incongruous circumstance of Germany’s limited endowment with 
sun, contrasted by its abundance of PV capacity, becomes particularly evident when compared with Australia, 
one of the sunniest countries in the world. While the average hours of bright sunshine ranges between 2,300 and 
3,300 in Australia, it lies between 1,300 and 1,900 in Germany (Frondel et al., 2014:4). 
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decades. In short, future electricity prices will rise further if Germany actually reaches its 
renewable goals (Hessler, Loebert 2013:350). 
Some sense for the extent of this rise can be gleaned from past developments. Between 
2000 and 2013, electricity prices more than doubled, from 13.94 to 28.84 ct/kWh (Figure 3). 
For typical households with an electricity consumption of 3,500 kWh per annum, this implies 
an additional burden of about 520 Euro per year. A key factor of this increase was the 
exploding installation of PV modules: The real net cost for all those modules installed 
between 2000 and 2013 accounts for some 110 Bn (Frondel et al., 2014:9) with PV currently 
comprising only about 5% of total electricity production.  
In terms of purchasing power parities, German households now incur the highest 
power prices in the European Union (EU) (Table 2). In a similar vein, prices for industrial 
customers are also among the highest in the EU, although wholesale prices at power 
exchanges shrunk between 2007 and 2013, a decrease that was mainly due to the augmented 
supply of green electricity (Würzburg et al., 2013, Ketterer, 2014).  
Figure 3: Composition of Residential Electricity Prices in Germany 
Source: BDEW (2014).  
Lower wholesale prices from the increased supply of RES, however, does not translate 
into lower retail prices because of the EEG levy that is required to cover the increase in 
average costs caused by the introduction of RES. Taxes and levies accounted for about 50% 
of the residential electricity price in 2013, whereas this share was as low as 30% in 2007 
(Figure 4). Only in Denmark are taxes and levies of more significance than in Germany, 
accounting for 57% of the residential electricity price in 2013 (Figure 4). That the electricity 
prices for Danish households are among the highest in the EU is partly due to the 
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subsidization of huge wind power capacities via feed-in tariffs (IEA 2011, ENS 2014), which, 
like Germany, was responsible for the fact that in this respect Denmark is among the leading 
countries in the world.  
Table 2: Electricity Prices in Purchasing Power Standards EUR ct/kWh for Households and Industry in 2014  
Country Households <500 MWh 
<2,000 
MWh 
<20,000 
MWh 
<70,000 
MWh 
<150,000 
MWh 
Austria 18.14 13.83 11.72 10.31 8.99 7.77 
Denmark 22.04 18.22 17.63 17.59 16.82 16.81 
EU 28 20.47 18.28 15.27 13.41 11.79 10.61 
France 14.08 12.41 10.28 8.84 7.94 7.02 
Germany  28.57 23.09 19.85 17.45 14.96 13.88 
Italy 24.17 23.25 19.76 16.93 15.07 11.26 
Netherlands 16.55 15.52 11.33 10.31 8.79 8.54 
United 
Kingdom 17.01 15.34 13.73 12.49 12.45 12.05 
       
Source: Eurostat (2014). Average prices per kWh (including taxes and duties) in the first half of 2014 for households with an 
annual electricity consumption between 2,500 and 5,000 kWh, as well as industrial consumers of different consumption 
levels. 
Figure 4: Electricity Prices in Purchasing Power Standards EUR ct/kWh for Danish and German Households with an 
Annual Consumption between 2,500 and 5,000 kWh  
 
Source: Eurostat (2014).  
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3 Energy Cost Burden and Distributional Effects 
Using panel data from the German Residential Energy Consumption Survey (GRECS) 
gathered by RWI and forsa (2011, 2013, 2015), this section’s focus is on the regressive 
impact of rising electricity cost on households below the poverty risk line. This line is defined 
at 60% of the median of the equivalent (i.e., per-capita adjusted) household income (BMAS, 
2013:461), henceforth equivalent median income (EMI).3 This 60% threshold is a widely used 
relative measure of poverty (Neuhoff et al., 2013).  
We employ data from three panel waves spanning the period 2006 to 2012 (RWI, 
forsa 2011, 2013, 2015), resulting in a database of about 7,800 households that at least once 
provided detailed information on their energy consumption and the related cost. For each of 
three panel waves, between 2,600 and 4,700 valid observations on households’ electricity 
consumption and the resulting cost are available. In addition to detailed energy consumption 
data, respondents provide information on socio-economic and building characteristics.4 While 
expenses for space and water heating are also available and account for a substantial share of 
energy-related expenditures, mobility costs are not included in our analysis. These costs are 
expected to be low among low-income households because such households typically do not 
possess a car and instead use the public transport system, often with rebated tickets. 
With respect to electricity consumption, the resulting burden – captured here primarily 
in terms of the proportion of electricity cost in net household income – tends to have 
increased for virtually all types of households, irrespective of their position in the income 
distribution (Figure 5). This increase, however, was most pronounced for those households 
that fell below the poverty risk line: In 2012, our sample households with low incomes spent, 
on average, almost 5.5% of their income on electricity, whereas the respective share was as 
low as 1.5% for wealthy households with incomes of up to three times the EMI. This gap 
between poverty-vulnerable and wealthy households has widened since 2006, when the 
respective proportions amounted to about 1.2% and 4.5%.  
This regressive effect of rising electricity prices can also be observed for the surcharge 
for green electricity (Figure 6). In 2012, households below the poverty risk line spent 0.75% 
                                                            
3 Following other analyses, such as Neuhoff et al. (2013), the transformation of household income relies on the 
modified OECD scale, which assigns a weight of 1 to the head of household, 0.5 for each additional adult 
member (over 14), and 0.3 for each child (Hagenaars et al. 1994). 
4 Income is defined here as the net household income including salaries and, inter alia, all kind of transfers, 
capital gains, and incomes from rent. 
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of their income for the promotion of renewables, compared with just 0.2% for those with a 
disposable income of up to three times the EMI. In 2006, these proportions were substantially 
lower and amounted to 0.19% and 0.05%, respectively. Coinciding with the tremendous 
increase in PV installations, particularly between 2009 and 2013 (Table 1), these shares began 
to surge in 2009, most notably for households at poverty risk (Figure 6). These results are in 
line with Nelson et al. (2011:113), who conclude that for low-income households in Australia, 
the effective taxation rate of FITs is three times that of the wealthiest households.  
Figure 5: Ratio of Electricity Cost to Disposable Income of German Households for a Variety of Income Levels. 
EMI = Equivalent Median Income  
Figure 6: Cost Proportions of Green Electricity Promotion in Disposable Income of German Households 
EMI = Equivalent Median Income 
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The distributional effects of increasing electricity prices become more apparent when 
focusing on particular household types that are prone to poverty. Single-person households 
are one such group. According to the fourth Poverty Report of the German government 
(BMAS, 2013:461), in 2011, 25% of single-person households earned an income that was 
lower than 60% of the EMI, while the overall poverty risk was about 15%. For our single-
person sample households, the income proportion spent to cover their electricity needs rose by 
26% between 2006 und 2012, from 4.1% to 5.2% (Table 3),5 most notably because average 
electricity prices increased by 30%, from 22.16 to almost 29 ct/kWh for this household type. 
Incomes grew much slower, by about 6%. Another indication of a mounting burden of single-
person households is that electricity cost increased relative to housing rents: In 2012, the ratio 
of electricity cost to net cold rents averaged 13.5% for single persons below the poverty risk 
line, compared to 11.1% in 2006, an increase of somewhat more than 20%. 
Table 3: Average Monthly Electricity Cost (in terms of the Median) of a Poverty-Vulnerable Single Person Household 
Earning up to 60% of the Median Income and Ratios of this Cost to both Net Income and Housing Rents. 
Year Number of Obs. 
Price 
(ct/kWh) 
Electricity 
Cost (€) 
Income 
(€) 
Portion of 
Income 
(%) 
Obs. 
Portion 
of Total 
Rent 
Portion 
of Net 
Cold 
Rent 
2006 60 22.16 28.27 694 4.13 42 8.21 11.14 
2007 78 23.15 30.96 709 4.61 60 9.05 12.49 
2008 81 24.05 32.89 723 4.65 62 9.14 12.88 
2009 78 25.76 31.90 711 4.49 62 8.70 12.55 
2010 114 26.07 34.10 724 4.71 97 9.45 13.29 
2011 150 27.74 35.33 725 5.04 113 9.04 12.93 
2012 177 28.80 37.30 738 5.20 142 9.21 13.50 
Note that instead of marginal prices, in this and the following tables, we employ average electricity prices that 
are calculated by including the fixed base rate per kWh and adding it to marginal prices. 
It is well-known that single parents are another group who are highly prone to poverty 
risks. This is confirmed by Germany’s fourth Poverty Report (BMAS, 2013:461), according 
to which about 42% of all single parents earned an income of just up to 60% of the EMI in 
2011. According to our data, single-parent households are particularly adversely affected by 
increasing power prices: In 2011, such households spent about 6.4% of their household 
income on electricity (Table 4), a rise of about two percentage points relative to 2006. Again, 
this owes to the fact that power prices have increased to a greater extent than incomes. Using 
                                                            
5 Note that in this and the following tables, all figures on the proportion of electricity cost relative to household 
income are median values of the individual proportions of our sample households. These median values may 
differ from the results that are obtained by the simple division of electricity cost by the income values as reported 
in the corresponding columns of the tables. 
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net cold rents as an alternative benchmark, our data reveals that the ratio of electricity cost to 
the net cold rent increased from 12% in 2006 to almost 15% in 2011.  
Poor childless couples appear to be yet another segment highly affected by rising 
electricity prices (Table 5). In 2012, their electricity expenditure accounted for more than 
6.2% of their disposable household income.6 This proportion marks an increase of 2.5 
percentage points, from 4.7% since 2006. In contrast, with a corresponding share of 2.1% in 
2012, childless couples with a household income of twice the EMI have a much lower 
electricity cost burden.  
Table 4: Monthly Electricity Cost Burden of Single Parents 
Year Number of Obs. 
Price 
(ct/kWh
) 
Electricit
y Cost (€)
Income 
(€) 
Portion 
of 
Income 
(%) 
Obs. 
Portion 
of 
Total 
Rent 
Portion 
of Net 
Cold 
Rent 
2006 47 19.95 45.98 1 157 4.46 26 8.69 11.95 
2007 50 21.56 47.70 1 181 4.77 27 10.02 13.61 
2008 39 22.12 49.10 1 204 4.64 23 8.91 14.79 
2009 55 23.55 52.02 1 186 5.71 29 10.48 13.71 
2010 43 23.90 54.57 1 207 5.17 28 10.93 15.18 
2011 54 26.36 57.88 1 209 6.41 27 10.16 14.75 
2012 60 26.64 55.31 1 230 5.44 31 9.42 14.06 
 
Table 5: Monthly Electricity Cost Burden of Childless Couples 
Income 
Level Year 
Number of 
Obs. 
Price 
(ct/kWh) 
Electricity 
Cost (€) Income (€) 
Portion of 
Income 
(%) 
Up to 60% of 
EMI 
2006 44 20.11 46.94 1 157 4.65 
2012 104 26.15 62.79 1 230 6.23 
Up to 100% 
of EMI 
2006 183 19.59 49.62 2 083 2.73 
2012 538 26.14 66.97 2 213 3.24 
Up to 200% 
of EMI 
2006 339 19.29 56.63 3 009 1.80 
2012 944 25.69 70.91 3 250 2.10 
Among all household types considered by Germany’s fourth Poverty Report, the 
lowest poverty risk exists for families with up to two children. In 2011, just one out of 10 of 
such households in Germany had a net income below the EMI (BMAS, 2013:461). Yet, for 
poverty-vulnerable sample households with up to two children, in 2012, the average 
electricity cost burden of 5.4% of net income was close to the average burden observed for all 
sample households at poverty risk (Figure 5 and Table 6). 
                                                            
6 While in 2006, the electricity cost of low-income couples aggregated to 11.2% of net cold rent, in 2012, this 
proportion was almost five percentage points higher. 
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In addition to power expenditure, poor households may suffer from heating cost, 
unless they receive basic or housing assistance that also covers this cost (Heindl, 2014:11). 
While data on heating cost is sparse in our database for some types of low-income 
households, particularly if fuels other than natural gas are employed for heating, we find that 
on average poor households spent about 7.1% of their income on heating when they use 
natural gas for this purpose (Table 7). Altogether, it may be easily the case that a low-income 
household’s total energy cost for both electricity and heating adds up to a sizable portion of 
12.6% of disposable income (7.1% for heating, see Table 7, and 5.5% for power, see Figure 
1), thereby exceeding the 10% threshold for fuel poverty defined by the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC, 213). 
Table 6: Monthly Electricity Cost Burden of Families with One Child or Two Children 
Income 
Level Year 
Number of 
Obs. 
Price 
(ct/kWh) 
Electricity 
Cost (€) Income (€) 
Portion of 
Income 
(%) 
Up to 60% of 
EMI 
2006 75 19.00 67.94 1 620 4.50 
2012 120 25.35 90.21 1 721 5.43 
Up to 100% 
of EMI 
2006 192 18.62 68.18 2 546 2.69 
2012 439 25.18 87.76 2 750 3.09 
Up to 200% 
of EMI 
2006 243 18.68 74.74 3 935 1.97 
2012 443 25.45 96.87 4 429 2.04 
 
Table 7: Monthly Gas Cost of German Households with Distinct Income Levels 
Income 
Level Year 
Number of 
Obs. 
Price 
(ct/kWh) 
Gas Cost 
(€) Income (€) 
Portion of 
Income 
(%) 
Up to 60%  
of EMI 
2006 62 6.80 91.75 1 157 7.71 
2012 98 7.19 81.60 1 230 7.10 
Up to 100% 
of EMI 
2006 168 6.50 102.90 2 083 4.61 
2012 420 6.81 90.58 2 250 3.82 
Up to 200% 
of EMI 
2006 276 6.35 121.33 3 472 3.57 
2012 657 6.80 96.33 3 689 2.76 
It bears noting that sample households below the poverty risk line have to pay a 
slightly higher average gas price per kWh than wealthier households (Table 7), which is due 
to the fact that the average price is calculated here by dividing total gas cost, including the 
fixed cost, by total gas consumption. As the gas consumption in kWh is lower for low-income 
households than for comparable wealthier households, the contribution of fixed cost to 
average per-kWh prices is larger than for wealthier households. Due to their higher gas 
consumption, which clearly correlates with household income, the monthly gas bill of 
wealthier households is nonetheless higher than for comparable low-income households. As 
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with electricity cost, however, the heating cost share in household income is much larger for 
households at poverty risk than for wealthy households earning up to the double of EMI, 7.1% 
versus some 2.8% in 2012 (Figure 7).  
Although it is possible that future fuel prices may fall following recent plummeting 
prices in the oil market, it seems more likely that the energy cost of German households will 
tend to rise in the future, as electricity prices will most likely surge given Germany’s 
ambitious renewable targets. According to these targets, the share of green electricity in gross 
consumption shall grow both fast and continually, to more than 35% by 2020, 50% by 2030, 
and 80% by 2050. Given the regressive nature of electricity prices that has been illustrated in 
this section, households at the lower tail of the income distribution would suffer more from 
the likely rise in electricity prices than wealthy households.  
4	Future	Electricity	Cost	of	Low‐Income	Households	
To describe the distributional impacts of further increasing power prices, this section presents 
two scenarios on future power prices, with Scenario 1, the more modest variant, being based 
on the so-called medium-term forecast for the EEG levy provided by the German 
Transmission System Operators (GTSO). In recent years, this surcharge was a major driver of 
household electricity prices (Figure 3). It is to be expected that this levy will continually rise 
further given Germany’s ambitious targets for the expansion of renewable capacities in the 
upcoming decades. Scenario 2 thus presumes a constant growth of this levy by 0.81 ct/kWh 
per year (Table 8), thereby reflecting its average annual increase between 2010 and 2015. 
Apart from the EEG levy for renewables and the Value Added Tax (VAT) amount, which is 
additionally raised on the EEG levy, we assume that the other electricity price components 
presented in Figure 3 are presumed to be the same in both scenarios. (Note that because the 
EEG levy is already known for the years 2013 – 2015, the electricity prices reported in Table 
8 are equal for both scenarios for these years and differ only later on.) 
Based on these scenarios for the EEG levy and the households’ individual electricity 
prices for 2012, we calculate individual forecasts for their future electricity prices by 
subtracting both the levy and the VAT on it from the prices for 2012 and adding both the levy 
for future years as reported in Table 8 and the respective VAT, thereby holding all other price 
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components constant.7 To estimate future electricity cost shares, we assume that the 
households’ individual electricity consumption remains constant at the average level of the 
years 2006-2012, for which respondents provided information. Moreover, household income 
is presumed to rise at the average rate of the EMI observed in the past.  
Table 8: Two Scenarios for the Future Level of the Renewables Levy and Household Electricity Prices in ct/kWh  
Scenario 1: Medium Term Forecast 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Levy 5.28 6.24 6.17 6.66 7.22 7.67 7.93 
VAT 1.00 1.19 1.17 1.27 1.37 1.46 1.51 
Price 28.68 30.42 30.97 32.19 33.51 34.74 35.74 
Scenario 2: Linear Extrapolation 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Levy 5.28 6.24 6.17 6.98 7.79 8.60 9.41 
VAT 1.00 1.19 1.17 1.33 1.48 1.63 1.79 
Price 28.68 30.42 30.97 32.57 34.19 35.84 37.51 
Source: BDEW (2014), GTSO (2014) and own calculations. 
According to Scenario 1, in which the EEG levy rises to 7.93 ct/kWh by 2019, the 
average household electricity price increases by nearly 25% between 2013 and 2019, to 
almost 36 ct/kWh (Table 8). If Scenario 1 materializes, in 2019 households below the poverty 
risk line would spend, on average, roughly 6.8% of their income on electricity (Figure 8). This 
proportion is almost four times higher than that for households with an income of up to three 
times the EMI, for which the respective portion amounts to just about 1.8% in 2019.  
This gap is even more pronounced in Scenario 2 (Figure 9), in which the electricity 
prices in 2019 would be almost 2 ct/kWh higher than in Scenario 1. This is due to the 
presumption of a stronger increase of the renewable levy, which reaches 9.41 ct/kWh by 2019 
in Scenario 2, compared to just 7.93 ct/kWh in Scenario 1. With a proportion of more than 7% 
of income in 2019 for households at poverty risk (Figure 9), the burden originating from 
electricity cost alone would come close to the well-known 10 percent threshold at which 
British households would be designated as suffering from fuel poverty. This appears to be 
particularly dramatic, because fuel cost for space heating commonly account for a large share 
of residential expenses as well and may be even higher than the electricity cost (Tables 6 and 
                                                            
7 This assumption may not be warranted for several reasons, for instance, because grid cost and the preservation 
of conventional power plants may increase electricity prices further (Hessler, Loebert, 2013:350), as well as 
because wholesale prices at power exchanges may shrink due to the ever-increasing supply of green electricity.  
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7, Heindl, 2014:33, Chawla, Pollitt, 2013). Overall, both Figure 8 and Figure 9 clearly 
indicate that the regressive impact of rising electricity prices widens the gap between poor and 
wealthy households over time. As a result, it is likely that Germany’s energy transition will 
enhance social problems that are caused by the distributional effects of growing power prices.  
Figure 8: Electricity Cost relative to Net Households Incomes in % under Scenario 1  
 
Figure 9: Electricity Cost relative to Net Household Income in % under Scenario 2 
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5	Summary	and	Conclusion	
Electricity prices for German households have virtually doubled since the outset of the new 
millennium. In terms of purchasing parities, German citizens have to pay the highest power 
prices of all EU countries in 2014. Among other reasons, such as the increase in the eco-tax 
on electricity, a key factor for the substantial rise in electricity prices was Germany’s 
transition of the energy sector, most notably the massive promotion of renewable energy 
technologies due to the introduction of a feed-in-tariff system in 2000.  
The consequences of Germany’s widely recognized promotion of alternative 
technologies, above all photovoltaics (PV), are mixed: On the one side, the share of green 
electricity in consumption increased with a speed seen nowhere else in the world, from less 
than 7% in 2000 to more than 25% in 2013. On the other side, this increase has been 
accompanied by regressive distributional effects in that poor households and those that are 
close to the poverty threshold suffer more from increases in their electricity cost than 
wealthier households. The number of households endangered from poverty in Germany is 
substantial, currently amounting to 7.5 million (Neuhoff et al., 2013:52). In other words, 
almost one fifth of Germany’s 40 million households (destatis, 2014) earn an income that, by 
definition, is lower than 60% of the median income. Given that the rapid extension of 
renewable capacities in the past already came at high cost, most notably due to the exploding 
growth of PV capacities in recent years, the question arises as to whether electricity 
consumers are willing to accept or, in case of poor households, are able to bear the increasing 
power expenditure. 
Focusing on low-income households over the period spanning 2006 to 2012, this paper 
has analyzed the evolution of the electricity cost burden. In accordance with other studies, 
such as Bardt and Niehues (2013) and Neuhoff et al. (2013:46), we find that Germany’s 
promotion of renewable energy technologies has strong distributional implications: Poor 
households have to spend increasing portions of their income on electricity bills. Our results 
are perfectly in line with the conclusion of Nelson et al. (2011, 2012), who find that feed-in 
tariffs imply a regressive form of taxation. This tendency will be enhanced if Germany should 
actually reach its ambitious national goals on the share of green electricity in gross electricity 
consumption. It is Germany’s declared aim to increase this share from about 25% today to 
35% in 2020 and 50% in 2030, with an ultimate target share of above 80% in 2050.  
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Realizing these targets implies additional cost in the form of subsidies for newly 
installed renewable energy technologies, as well as for sustaining conventional power plants. 
Because of the volatility of the electricity generation from wind and solar power, conventional 
backup power plants will be required to ensure supply security if large storage capacities are 
lacking and remain expensive in the future. The load hours and, hence, the profitability of 
these conventional plants, however, is undercut by the increased share of the very renewable 
technologies they are intended to back up. One frequently suggested solution to this security-
of-supply-conundrum is the introduction of so-called capacity mechanisms. Yet, these 
mechanisms would imply additional cost for consumers, as they remunerate the pure 
existence of backup capacities that would be needed in times of low wind and solar electricity 
production. Furthermore, electricity grids have to be expanded (Hessler, Loebert, 2013), as 
the electricity produced in the north of Germany on the basis of wind power must be 
transported to the south, where capacity deficits already prevail, and will become more 
serious as a consequence of Germany’s nuclear phase-out. 
For these reasons, it might well be the case that the future electricity cost exceeds the 
burden resulting from the scenarios presumed in this article. This raises the urgent question of 
how to mitigate the social consequences of increasing electricity cost for households at 
poverty risk. There are numerous suggestions that address this issue. For example, to alleviate 
the distributional effects, one option would be to drop the surcharge for the promotion of 
renewable technologies and instead finance the subsidies for renewables through the general 
tax system (Bardt et al., 2012:12). Given the progressive income tax tariff in Germany, 
wealthier households would then have to bear a higher burden, whereas low-income 
households would pay much less than under the current consumption-based renewable 
subsidization regime (Bardt et al., 2012:12). Yet, this suggestion would be counterproductive 
for environmental reasons, as without the EEG surcharge, electricity prices would less reflect 
the true external cost of generating electricity. As a result, incentives for reducing electricity 
consumption would be weakened and, hence, negative environmental effects from fossil-
based generation would increase.  
Another option suggested by Neuhoff et al. (2013:51) is a consumption threshold up to 
which a reduced eco-tax on electricity is raised, thereby dampening the electricity cost burden 
of all consumers, not just poor households. This suggestion is also subject to the criticism that 
incentives for electricity savings would be weakened by lower cost. Moreover, all households 
would enjoy this reduced burdened, including those not threatened by energy poverty. Yet 
 
 
17 
 
another alternative, and one which we advocate, would be to extend means-tested cash 
transfers to poor households to compensate them for the rise in the electricity cost. This 
alternative has two virtues: it is directly targeted at aiding the poor and, by maintaining high 
electricity costs, preserves the conservation incentive for households across the income 
spectrum.  
In addition to the social-policy option of raising transfers, it would be highly 
reasonable to switch to another renewable promotion scheme to dampen future electricity cost 
increases for German households. In fact, as suggested by the Monopoly Commission and the 
German Council of Economic Experts (SVR, 2011:253), Germany’s very costly feed-in tariff 
(FIT) system should be abolished and replaced by a much more cost-efficient promotion 
scheme, such as a renewable quota system combined with green certificates. Otherwise, the 
broad acceptance of Germany’s energy transition among the citizenry might abate.  
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